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STUDENT NOTES
the profits, . . ." The note to the L. R. A. report of this case
says: "The opinion of the judges in the above case very fully
presents the principles of the law as to the existence of a partnership. Without attempting any annotation of the question we call
attention to the earlier cases", etc.
It is therefore submitted that the parties A and B in the West
Virginia case were not joint adventurers. They were not partners.
It is also contended that the same result could have been reached
on the contract theory alone, i. e., the B Company at the most is
entitled to no more than the worth of its contract at the time of the
breach. Even if the A Company had breached the contract this
would be so. Therefore, the B Company can receive the amount
the A 'Company was to pay it by its contract with that company
less the cost of completing that contract. This would be what the
A Company spent in completing the contract, and if the B Company charged rent on the machinery, that would be part of the A
Company's costs and would be deducted from the amount to be
paid to the B Company and would be in effect not allowing the
B Company rent on the machinery. The A Company and the B
Company were simply contractor and sub-contractor, and the decision reached could have been obtained solely on the basis of the
contract between them.
We are, therefore, a little puzzled as to why the court used the
joint-adventure theory. Did the court intend to impose a fiduciary relationship upon such a relationship as contractor and subcontractor ?
-- HENRY K. HIGGINBOTHAM.

BANKS AND BANKING-PREFERRED CLAIMs AGAINST INSOLVENT
BANK ON THE THEORY OF TRUSTS.-BANK DRATS AS AsSIGNMENTS

OF FUNDs.-The Bank of Mullens, a state bank in West Virginia,
and the Federal Reserve Bank qf Richmond made an arrangement
whereby the Federal Reserve Bank agreed to cash checks drawn
on the Mullens Bank by its depositors. The Bank of Mullens
agreed to remit immediately to the Federal Reserve Bank by draft
on certain designated banks, one of which was the First National
Exchange Bank of Roanoke, Virginia.
In accordance with this arrangement about $20,000 worth of
checks were cashed by the Federal Reserve Bank and sent to
Hullens. The Mullens Bank drew two drafts on the bank in
Roanoke aggregating some $12,000, and returned the remaining
cheeks with said drafts to Federal. The amount of the deposit
in the Roanoke bank was sufficient to cover the drafts. When they
were presented for payment, Mullens had been closed by the
banking commissioner and payment was refused.
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The Central Trust Company, having been appointed receiver
for Mnllens, ified a suit in equity to convene the creditors and
settle its affairs. The Federal Reserve Bank Intervened seeking
a preferred claim. Held, The Federal Reserve Bank was allowed
a preferred claim on three grounds: (1) "That said fund and
cash in the bank was a trust in the hands of the receiver for reimbursement of the Federal Reserve Bank." (2) "That the Federal
Reserve Bank should be preferred over general creditors as an
equitable assignee of the fund on which the drafts 0 0 * were
drawn", in spite of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which declares that a check of itself does not operate as an assignment of
any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank.
(3) While the court apparently bases the decision on the above
principles, it would seem that the real footing upon which the
ease rests is the notion of the court that a contrary holding would
have a disastrous economic effect upon banking transactions of this
character. Near the end of the opinion the court quotes with approval from Morse on Banks and Banking to the following effect:
"But if the effect upon commercial life of subjecting checks to this
uncertainty be considered, it appears at once that justice to social
prosperity requires that the check-holder shall be preferred".'
It is submitted that the decision is certainly doubtful, if not
erroneous, on all three grounds. The points will be taken up in
order, the trust theory being considered first.
1. It is admitted in the opinion, and the cases so hold, that in
the absence of any reciprocal accounts between two banks, the
relation between a forwarding and a collecting bank is one of
principal and agent before collection. 2 It is also the majority rule
that after collection has been actually made, the relation is that
of debtor and creditor, the conclusion being based upon the custom
of banks to credit the forwarding bank and remit in the bank's
usual exchange, thereby destroying the trust res. 1 There are comparatively few cases holding that the trust relation exists where
' Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullens, 150 S. E. 137 (W. Va. 1929).
Andrew v. Hamilton Co. State Bank, 223, N. W. 176 (Ia. 1929) ; Chase
& Co. v. Norfolk Ban1c, 151 Va. 65, 145 S. E. 594 (1928); Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Tierney, 270 Pac. 792 (N. Mex. 1928); Kaplan v. W. A. Ferson Co.,
194 N. C. 712, 140 S. E. 617 (1927); Cameron v. Carnegie Trust Co., 292
Pa. 114, 140 Atl. 768 (1928); Dudley v. Phoenix-Girard Bank, 16 Ala. 591,
114 So. 188 (1927); National Bank v. Finn, 253 Paa. 757 (Cal. 1927);
Citizens Bank v. Spokane Trust Co., 143 Wash. 9, 254 Pac. 238.
8tU. S. Nat. Bank v. Glanton, 146 Ga. 786, 92 S. E. 625 (1917); Citizens
Bank v. Spokane Trust Co., supra; C. & S. Ry. Co. v. Docking, 124 Kan. 48,
257 Pac. 743 (1927); Sabine Canal Co. v. Crowley Trust & Savings Bank,
164 La. 33, 113 So. 754 (1927); Union Nat. Bank v. Citizens Bank, 153
Ind. 44, 54 N. E. 97 (1899).
2
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the proceeds of the collection are to be remitted forthwith. But
even though a trust exists, the cestui is not entitled to a preferred
claim upon the insolvency of the collecting bank unless there has
'been an augmentation of the assets; or in other words, unless the
proceeds of the collection which constitutes the trust fund can be
traced into the general assets of the insolvent bank. 4 These cases
also hold that there must be an actual increase in the assets, and
not a mere juggling of accounts on the books of the bank. 1
But the question still remains as to whether the trust theory
can be supported in the principal case. A trust relation requires
a trust res. What is the res in the principal case, or in Federal
Reserve Bank v. Peters, 1 upon which the court in the instant case
mainly relies? Actually, there is none.
It must be assumed that the Federal Reserve Bank actually
cashed and paid out money on the checks sent by it to Iullens for
collection. It was, therefore, not merely a forwarding agent for
the holder of the check because the agreement with Mullens required it to cash its check. The moment Federal cashed the checks
in accordance with such an agreement it advanced or loaned money
to Mullens-purely the relation of debtor and creditor.
Upon principle and reason, how can this relation be transformed into one of cestui and trustee by agreeing in advance upon
the procedure of immediate remittance upon collection? The sending of the checks to Mullens amounted only to a demand for remittance forthwith according to the -agreement. There never was
any trust res.
It is here admitted that in true collection and remittance cases
a trust relation is established after collection. But in those cases
the forwarding bank simply acts as an agent for the holder of the
paper, which is the trust res. It is presented to the maker or
drawer and collection made, which in truth becomes the trust fund.
Then, if the fund is wrongfully mingled with the assets of the
bank, the owner of the paper il entitled to a preferred claim provided he can trace the fund into the general assets of the insolvent
bank. But those cases are wholly disimilar to the principal case,
and those relied upon to support it. '
4 Hrecker-Jones-Jewel Milling Co. v. Trust Co., 242 Afass. 181, 136 N. E.
333 (1922) ; Billingsly v. Pollock, 69 Miss. 759, 13 So. 828 (1892) ; State
Bank of Wjinfield v. Alave Security Bank, 232 Fed. 847 (1916) ; Rorebeck v.
Benedict Flour Co., 26 F. (2d) 440 (1928).
, Midland Nat. Bank -u. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 358, 49 S. W. 994 (1899). For
general discussion of cases dealing with above propositions, see 24 A. L. R.
1152; 42 A. L. R. 754; 3 P. C. L. 265; 1 MoRsE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th
ed.) 214.
6 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379 (1924).
7 Authorities cited above.
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The courts adhering to the view in the instant case, however,
try to evade this objection by calling the checks the trust res.
When sent to the drawee bank for collection, it becomes the agent
to present them to itself for collection. Then, according to the
agreement to remit forthwith, the collecting bank is treated as if
it had agreed to set apart the funds collected. After setting up
this fictitious duty to segregate the funds the courts say, "Equity
regards that as done which ought to have been done," and ipso
facto there is the trust fund. 8 The whole procedure is theoretical
and fictional, and the courts never do explain what became of the
debtor-creditor relation which was established in the first instance. Suppose the payee of a note sent it to the maker for collection. Would the court hold that such transmittal made the
maker an agent to present to himself and thereby gave the payee
a preferred claim in bankruptcy because the maker was supposed
to segregate the funds which he paid to himself as agent. Yet that
would seem to be the result of the logic of the principal case.
2. Apparently not quite satisfied with the conclusion as based
upon the trust theory, the court proceeded to announce another
principal concerning the delivery of a draft or check, saying it
amounted to an assignment as between the drawer and payee. It
will be observed at the outset that this principle alone would have
decided the case in favor of the Federal Reserve Bank, and the
court need not have uttered a syllable about a trust. Before the
Negotiable Instruments Law there was a conflict of authority upon
this question. The majority rule was that a check of itself did
not operate as an assignment of the fund of. the drawer with the
bank, but was simply an authority to the bank to pay the check on
presentment. Consequently, the death or insolvency of the drawer
ipso facto revoked the agency and the holder (if also the payee)
was not entitled to a preferred claim in the estate of the decedent
or bankrupt. 8 The minority view, followed in West Virginia, was
contra and preferred claims were allowed in insolvency cases " and
by analogy with other jurisdictions probably would have allowed
them in eases of death. 1 o
Due to the irreconcilable conflict in the law merchant as enforced in the various states, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law was drafted. The purpose of the act, in connection with the.
point here involved, is aptly expressed by Mr. Brannan.1' He says:
REv. 104.
9Hulings v. Hulings, 38 W. Va. 351, S. E. (19 ).
10 14 HAnv. L. REv. 588.
-1BANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, p. 407.
8 17 HAnv. I.
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"Before the Negotiable Instruments Law, the question whether a
check was an assignment of any part of the drawer's funds had
been considered by the courts, both with respect to the rights of
the holder against the drawee and the rights of the holder against
the drawer or the latter's creditors or estate, and there had been
differences of opinion on both questions. Before the statute, the
weight of authority was that -a check was not an assignment in
either respect. The purpose of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was to abrogate this conflict, and when the statute declares that a check of itself does not operate as an assignment, to
say that it does so operate in any case is to declare the exact opposite of the statute."
In the principal case, therefore, the court has repealed the first
part of the statute, 12 and has gone back to the rule announced in
the Hulings Case before the statute was enacted. The court, however, did not hesitate to abrogate it because it had the notion that
"justice to social prosperity required that the check holder should
be preferred" over depositors.
The net result, then, of the points actually decided is that a
doctrine of trusts is established where there is no trust, and every
holder of a bank draft or check is entitled to a preferred claim
upon the insolvency or death of the drawer. Since this decision,
the writer understands that the banking commissioner allows preferred claims to all holders of bank drafts.
3. Considering the fact that the court admits that an important
factor in the decision of the principal case was that of economic
effect, the soundness of its point of view in that respect remains
to be discussed. It is not the purpose of this note to condemn the
court for looking to that factor in deciding the case. On the contrary, it is admitted that the court properly considered it. The
question is, did the court get off the fence on the right side? In so
far as the principles of law enunciated in the opinion are concerned, the briefs submitted to the court by counsel presented two
plausible courses. The court selected the one which supported
the desired result.
12

Ch. 98A, § 189, CODE.
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The factor of economic effect raises two questions.
(a) What effect will the decision have upon the augmentation
of preferred claims? Certainly, it cannot be doubted that the
holding creates a new class of preferred claims. The only question is how large the amount will be. In the instant case the total
drafts outstanding in the hands of Federal alone was more than
$12,000, but was reduced to some $10,000 by stipulation. Of
course, the amount will vary according to the volume of business
done by the particular bank. However, the assertion may be safely
made that the figures will range somewhere between $10,000 and
$20,000. But whatever the amount, the depositors bear the loss.
In natural equity and justice, should they be compelled to stand
it? It is believed that they should not. In the first place, a bank
is better able financially to bear it, and further, it has recourse
against the indorsers. In the second place, the forwarding bank
has facilities for ascertaining the true financial condition of its
correspondent, and the depositors have not. By the exercise of a
reasonable amount of diligence, a forwarding bank should lose
nothing, whereas the depositors are totally in the dark. The decision places a premium on a depositor's good faith and trust in a
bank.
(b) What effect would a contrary holding have upon the circulation of bank drafts? It is submitted there would be none. The
doctrine established in the principal case is of very recent origin.
Banks transacted business in the same manner for many years,
and the only preferred claims allowed were those given by courts
adhering to the rule that the draft operated as an assignment. It
would seem that such a sudden and drastic departure from the
settled rule should be supported by some explanation showing a
real need for it. The only explanation appearing in the opinion
is the one previously quoted, viz., the justice to social prosperity
requires it. And in another place, the court says, "Although
probably contrary to the weight of authority, we are in accord
with the modern trend. .. " But it should be noted that nowhere
in the opinion is there any economic data to support either of these
conclusions.
We have the decision. What can be done about it? Apparently
nothing but the passage of a statute disallowing this particulak
type of preferred claims altogether. Both the law of trusts and
the negotiable instruments law have been unavailing.
-JAMES E. HOGUE, JR.
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